Coordination and Coming to Be.
The following are purported to be common-sense features of the world: time's passage, the unreality of the future, the existence of 'genuine' change. All of these common-sense features are accommodated by accepting the phenomenon of absolute becoming, a view of temporal passage in which the unreal f...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 101; no. 1; pp. 213 - 228 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Mar2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162055928&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162055928 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Mar2023 vid: 101 iid: 1 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 162055928 10.1080/00048402.2021.1975138 ppf: 213 ppct: 15 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1015KB tig: atl: Coordination and Coming to Be. aug: au: Leininger, Lisa affil: Hobart and William Smith Colleges su: Phenomenalism Pluralism Philosophy Evaluation Idealism sug: subj: Phenomenalism Pluralism Philosophy Evaluation Idealism keyword: absolute becoming dispositions laws of nature temporal passage time ab: The following are purported to be common-sense features of the world: time's passage, the unreality of the future, the existence of 'genuine' change. All of these common-sense features are accommodated by accepting the phenomenon of absolute becoming, a view of temporal passage in which the unreal future comes into existence in the present. Indeed, most philosophers who lay claim to common-sense views of time accept absolute becoming. I argue that absolute becoming has deeply unintuitive consequences. Specifically, proponents of absolute becoming face what I call the coordination problem: in the absence of a connection between the existing present and the unreal future, one must, but cannot, explain how whatever comes into existence preserves the continuing regularity of the world. The standard options to explain the continuing regularity of the world take the form of appealing to enforcers—causation, laws of nature, and dispositions—to guarantee that what comes into existence preserves these regularities. I show that the very nature of a world in which there is no future means that enforcers cannot guarantee this regular nature of the world. Absolute becoming should therefore be rejected: the future does not come into existence; it already exists. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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