Degrees of Objectivity? Mathemata and Social Objects.
A down-to-earth admission of abstract objects can be based on detailed explanation of where the objectivity of mathematics comes from, and how a 'thin' notion of object emerges from objective mathematical discourse or practices. We offer a sketch of arguments concerning both points, as a basis for c...
| Publicado en: | Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 42; no. 1; pp. 199 - 210 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Feb2023
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162113262&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162113262 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01677411 NM2 jtl: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy issn: 01677411 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2023 vid: 42 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 162113262 10.1007/s11245-022-09836-8 ppf: 199 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 758KB tig: atl: Degrees of Objectivity? Mathemata and Social Objects. aug: au: Ferreirós, José affil: Department of Philosophy and Logic, Universidad de Sevilla, C/ Camilo J. Cela, s/n, 41018, Seville, Spain su: Objectivity Social comparison Ontology sug: subj: Objectivity Social comparison Ontology keyword: Abstract objects Conceptual structuralism Objectivity in mathematics Thin ontology ab: A down-to-earth admission of abstract objects can be based on detailed explanation of where the objectivity of mathematics comes from, and how a 'thin' notion of object emerges from objective mathematical discourse or practices. We offer a sketch of arguments concerning both points, as a basis for critical scrutiny of the idea that mathematical and social objects are essentially of the same kind—which is criticized. Some authors have proposed that mathematical entities are indeed institutional objects, a product of our collective imposition of function onto reality (the phrase comes from Searle) and of surrogation or hypostasis. Yet there are significant disanalogies between the typical social objects and mathemata, on which basis I argue that one should make a clear distinction between both. The comparison of mathematical with social objects helps understanding how non-physical objects can figure prominently in our explanations of reality. Yet mathematical objects have a different kind of cognitive grounding, and the more elementary of them emerge under relatively very simple sociocultural conditions. The differences are also reflected in the wide scope of use of mathematical concepts, and the much higher degree of variation found among social objects. On the basis of all of these features, I defend the thesis that one can significantly distinguish degrees of objectivity, and I use the distinction to articulate a graded ontology where one can locate the different kinds of mathematical and social objects. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|