Why avowals must be assertions.
In Philosophical Investigations §244, Wittgenstein suggests that we understand avowals (first‐person psychological utterances) as manifestations or expressions of the speaker's mental states. An interesting philosophical theory, called expressivism, then develops from this Wittgensteinian idea. Howe...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Investigations Vol. 46; no. 2; pp. 221 - 240 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Apr2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162203322&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162203322 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01900536 BS4 jtl: Philosophical Investigations issn: 01900536 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 46 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 162203322 10.1111/phin.12369 ppf: 221 ppct: 19 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 181KB tig: atl: Why avowals must be assertions. aug: au: Fan, Ning affil: University of Tennessee, Knoxville Tennessee, , USA su: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 sug: subj: Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951 ab: In Philosophical Investigations §244, Wittgenstein suggests that we understand avowals (first‐person psychological utterances) as manifestations or expressions of the speaker's mental states. An interesting philosophical theory, called expressivism, then develops from this Wittgensteinian idea. However, neo‐expressivists disagree with simple expressivists on whether avowals are at the same time assertions, which are truth‐evaluable. In this paper, I pursue the expressivist debate about whether avowals must also be viewed as assertions. I consider and reject three neo‐expressivist objections against simple expressivism. Then, I offer my own account of why we should understand avowals as assertions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophical Investigations is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophical Investigations holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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