Storing power: market structure matters.

We assess how firms' incentives to operate and invest in energy storage depend on the market structure. For this purpose, we characterize equilibrium market outcomes allowing for market power in storage and/or production, as well as for vertical integration between storage and production. Market pow...

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Publicado en:RAND Journal of Economics (Wiley-Blackwell) Vol. 54; no. 1; pp. 3 - 54
Autores principales: Andrés‐Cerezo, David, Fabra, Natalia
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Mar2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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      dt: Mar2023
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        atl: Storing power: market structure matters.
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        au:
          Andrés‐Cerezo, David
          Fabra, Natalia
        affil:
          Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
          Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and CEPR
      su:
        Market design & structure (Economics)
        Market power
        Vertical integration
        Market equilibrium
        Energy storage
      sug:
        subj:
          Market design & structure (Economics)
          Market power
          Vertical integration
          Market equilibrium
          Energy storage
      ab: We assess how firms' incentives to operate and invest in energy storage depend on the market structure. For this purpose, we characterize equilibrium market outcomes allowing for market power in storage and/or production, as well as for vertical integration between storage and production. Market power reduces overall efficiency through two channels: It induces an inefficient use of the storage facilities, and it distorts investment incentives. The worst outcome for consumers and total welfare occurs under vertical integration. The results are key to understanding how to regulate energy storage, an issue which is critical for the deployment of renewable energies.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
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