Resolutions Against Uniqueness.

The paper presents a new argument for epistemic permissivism. The version of permissivism that we defend is a moderate version that applies only to explicit doxastic attitudes. Drawing on Yalcin's framework for modeling such attitudes, we argue that two fully rational subjects who share all their ev...

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Published in:Erkenntnis Vol. 88; no. 3; pp. 1013 - 1034
Main Authors: Lota, Kenji, Hlobil, Ulf
Format: Article
Published: Springer Nature Mar2023
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: Resolutions Against Uniqueness.
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          Lota, Kenji
          Hlobil, Ulf
        affil:
          Philosophy Department, University of Miami, 1252 Memorial Drive, 33124, Coral Gables, FL, USA
          Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
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        Implicit attitudes
        Attitude (Psychology)
        Argument
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        subj:
          Implicit attitudes
          Attitude (Psychology)
          Argument
      ab: The paper presents a new argument for epistemic permissivism. The version of permissivism that we defend is a moderate version that applies only to explicit doxastic attitudes. Drawing on Yalcin's framework for modeling such attitudes, we argue that two fully rational subjects who share all their evidence, prior beliefs, and epistemic standards may still differ in the explicit doxastic attitudes that they adopt. This can happen because two such subjects may be sensitive to different questions. Thus, differing intellectual interests can yield failures of uniqueness. This is not a merely pragmatic phenomenon.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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