Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism: Do the Prolegomena Indicate a Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations?
This is very important for our argument, since Husserl has previously in the I Prolegomena i identified a mechanism (the thought-machine) that might explain the descriptions (in ideal evaluation) that follow the I Prolegomena i . The causal connection between the mechanics and the computation in fac...
| Publicado en: | Husserl Studies Vol. 39; no. 1; pp. 47 - 69 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162584648&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162584648 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01679848 OG6 jtl: Husserl Studies issn: 01679848 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 39 iid: 1 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 162584648 10.1007/s10743-022-09315-3 ppf: 47 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 905KB tig: atl: Phenomenology as Proto-Computationalism: Do the Prolegomena Indicate a Computational Reading of the Logical Investigations? aug: au: Lopes, Jesse D. affil: 555 Northfield Rd., 01378, Warwick, MA, USA su: Phenomenology Intuition Philosophy of mind Philosophy of science Theory of mind Ethnopsychology Intentionality (Philosophy) Inference (Logic) sug: subj: Phenomenology Intuition Philosophy of mind Philosophy of science Theory of mind Ethnopsychology Intentionality (Philosophy) Inference (Logic) ab: This is very important for our argument, since Husserl has previously in the I Prolegomena i identified a mechanism (the thought-machine) that might explain the descriptions (in ideal evaluation) that follow the I Prolegomena i . The causal connection between the mechanics and the computation in fact is Husserl's point of view - indeed Adorno is explicating Husserl. But just as in the earlier essay, Husserl does not think a I biological i interpretation of the thought-economy is adequate to "the most important fact we know about minds" - namely, that mental processes preserve truth (Fodor [15], 9)[9]. McIntyre believes the central difference between Husserl and Fodor is that Husserl does not want to reduce intentionality to syntax, whereas Fodor does. Husserl's Denkmaschine Perhaps the most important source of evidence for the determination of our question can be found in that semi-famous passage of the I Prolegomena i (1900) where Husserl reveals a commitment to the computational nature of thought processes ([27], 79/2001, 50). pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Husserl Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Husserl Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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