Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics.
It is often claimed that Russellian monism carries a commitment to a structuralist conception of physics, on which physics describes the world only in terms of its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. We argue that this claim is mistaken. On Russellian monism, there is more to consciousness, and t...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 88; no. 4; pp. 1409 - 1429 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Apr2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162584809&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162584809 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 88 iid: 4 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 162584809 10.1007/s10670-021-00408-7 ppf: 1409 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 658KB tig: atl: Russellian Monism and Structuralism About Physics. aug: au: Alter, Torin Pereboom, Derk affil: The University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, USA Cornell University, Ithaca, USA su: Structuralism Physics Monism Consciousness Argument Concrete sug: subj: Structuralism Physics Monism Consciousness Argument Concrete ab: It is often claimed that Russellian monism carries a commitment to a structuralist conception of physics, on which physics describes the world only in terms of its spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. We argue that this claim is mistaken. On Russellian monism, there is more to consciousness, and to the rest of concrete reality, than spatiotemporal structure and dynamics. But the latter claim supports only a conditional claim about physics: if structuralism about physics is true, then there is more to consciousness and to the rest of concrete reality than physics describes. Given the fundamental nature of their position, Russellian monists can, we argue, deny the antecedent without inconsistency. We also draw out two significant consequences of that result. One is that it provides a response to some recent objections to Russellian monism, by Alyssa Ney and Eric Hiddleston. The other consequence concerns a line of reasoning known as the structure and dynamics argument—reasoning that is thought to motivate Russellian monism. In David J. Chalmers's version, which is regarded as canonical, structuralism about physics is implied by a premise. If our main thesis is true, then that version is problematic, at least from the perspective of Russellian monists who take the argument to motivate their theory. However, we argue, the argument can be reformulated without relying on structuralism about physics. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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