Mereological Destruction and Relativized Parthood: A Reply to Costa and Calosi.

Metaphysicians of various stripes claim that a single object can have more than one exact location in space or time – e.g. endurantists claim that an object persists by being 'all there' at different moments in time. Antony Eagle has developed a formal theory of location which is prima facie consist...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Erkenntnis Vol. 88; no. 4; pp. 1797 - 1807
Autor principal: Payton, Jonathan D.
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162584824&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: hlh
    uiTerm: 162584824
    longDbName: Humanities International Complete
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        01650106
        5KZ
      jtl: Erkenntnis
      issn: 01650106
      maglogo: N
    pubinfo:
      dt: Apr2023
      vid: 88
      iid: 4
      pid: 237
      pub: Springer Nature
    artinfo:
      ui:
        162584824
        10.1007/s10670-021-00423-8
      ppf: 1797
      ppct: 10
      formats:
        fmt:
          – @attributes:
              type: T
          – @attributes:
              type: P
              size: 680KB
      tig:
        atl: Mereological Destruction and Relativized Parthood: A Reply to Costa and Calosi.
      aug:
        au: Payton, Jonathan D.
        affil: Department of Philosophy, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
      su:
        Stripes
        Theorists
      sug:
        subj:
          Stripes
          Theorists
      ab: Metaphysicians of various stripes claim that a single object can have more than one exact location in space or time – e.g. endurantists claim that an object persists by being 'all there' at different moments in time. Antony Eagle has developed a formal theory of location which is prima facie consistent with multi-location, but Damiano Costa and Claudio Calosi argue that the theory is unattractive to multi-location theorists on other grounds. I examine their charge that Eagle's theory won't allow an endurantist to account for certain cases of mereological change. I argue that the charge sticks, but not for the reasons Costa and Calosi think. Along the way, I explore an issue which is underexplored in their paper, namely, how an endurantist might modify Eagle's theory to incorporate a parthood relation which obtains, not absolutely, but only relative to times.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: Y
      custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved.
      item: Erkenntnis
      holder: Springer Nature
      dt:
        @attributes:
          year: 2023
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N