Fine's Monster Objection Defanged.
The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It a...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 73; no. 2; pp. 435 - 452 |
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| Autores principales: | , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Apr2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=162589597&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 162589597 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 73 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 162589597 10.1093/pq/pqac040 ppf: 435 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 274KB tig: atl: Fine's Monster Objection Defanged. aug: au: Costa, Damiano Cecconi, Alessandro Calosi, Claudio affil: Università della Svizzera italiana and University of Geneva , Switzerland su: Monsters Hylomorphism Metaphysics Whole & parts (Philosophy) Presentism (Philosophy) sug: subj: Monsters Hylomorphism Metaphysics Whole & parts (Philosophy) Presentism (Philosophy) keyword: hylomorphism Monster Objection presentism standard mereology temporary mereology three- and four-dimensionalism ab: The Monster Objection has often been considered one of the main reasons to explore non-standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism and three- and four-dimensionalism, provide different ways of undermining the objection. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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