A Humean Non-Humeanism.

How should we account for the extraordinary regularity in the world? Humeans and Non-Humeans sharply disagree. According to Non-Humeans, the world behaves in an extraordinarily regular way because of certain necessary connections in nature. However, Humeans have thought that Non-Humean views are met...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 3; pp. 1031 - 1049
Autor principal: Builes, David
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Mar2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: A Humean Non-Humeanism.
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        au: Builes, David
        affil: Philosophy Department, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
      su:
        Hume, David, 1711-1776
        Metaphysics
        Physical laws
        Philosophy & science
        Philosophy of nature
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          Hume, David, 1711-1776
          Metaphysics
          Physical laws
          Philosophy & science
          Philosophy of nature
      keyword:
        Laws of nature
        Modality
        Monism
        Persistence
        Powers
      ab: How should we account for the extraordinary regularity in the world? Humeans and Non-Humeans sharply disagree. According to Non-Humeans, the world behaves in an extraordinarily regular way because of certain necessary connections in nature. However, Humeans have thought that Non-Humean views are metaphysically objectionable. In particular, there are two general metaphysical principles that Humeans have found attractive that are incompatible with all existing versions of Non-Humeanism. My goal in this paper is to develop a novel version of Non-Humeanism that is consistent with (and even entails) both of these general metaphysical principles. By endorsing such a view, one can have the explanatory benefits of Non-Humeanism while at the same time avoiding two of the major metaphysical objections towards Non-Humeanism.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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