MORAL FACTS AND SUITABLY INFORMED SUBJECTS: A REPLY TO DENHAM.
The nature of moral facts, and their relationship to rationality, imagination and sentiment, have been central and pressing issues in recent moral philosophy. In this paper, I discuss and criticise a meta-ethical theory put forward by Alison Denham, which views moral facts as being constituted by th...
| Publicado en: | Ratio Vol. 18; no. 1; pp. 82 - 93 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2005
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=16271362&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 16271362 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00340006 D8S jtl: Ratio issn: 00340006 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2005 vid: 18 iid: 1 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 16271362 10.1111/j.1467-9329.2005.00272.x ppf: 82 ppct: 11 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 59KB tig: atl: MORAL FACTS AND SUITABLY INFORMED SUBJECTS: A REPLY TO DENHAM. aug: au: McGonigal, Andrew affil: School of Philosophy, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT. su: Reason Ethics Theory (Philosophy) Nature Character Philosophy sug: subj: Reason Ethics Theory (Philosophy) Nature Character Philosophy ab: The nature of moral facts, and their relationship to rationality, imagination and sentiment, have been central and pressing issues in recent moral philosophy. In this paper, I discuss and criticise a meta-ethical theory put forward by Alison Denham, which views moral facts as being constituted by the responses of ideal, empathetic agents. I argue that Denham's account is radically unstable, in that she has given us an account of the nature of such agents which is inconsistent with an independently plausible principle relating to concept acquisition. I go on to discuss one line of defence that Denham might employ, but argue that taking such a line entails abandoning what she takes to be an important advantage of her account over rival ideal-observer theories such as Michael Smith’s. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Ratio is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Ratio holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2005 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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