Semantic relativism, expressives, and derogatory epithets.

Semantic relativism maintains that the truth-value of some propositions is sensitive to a judge parameter, facilitating cases whereby a proposition can be true relative to one judge, but false relative to another. Most prominently, semantic relativism has been applied to predicates of personal taste...

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Publicado en:Inquiry Vol. 66; no. 4; pp. 471 - 492
Autores principales: Berškytė, Justina, Stevens, Graham
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Taylor & Francis Ltd May2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        10.1080/0020174X.2019.1612778
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        atl: Semantic relativism, expressives, and derogatory epithets.
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          Berškytė, Justina
          Stevens, Graham
        affil: Philosophy Department, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK
      su:
        Oxford University Press
        Relativity
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          Oxford University Press
          Relativity
      keyword:
        derogatory epithets
        expressives
        predicates of personal taste
        Semantic relativism
      ab: Semantic relativism maintains that the truth-value of some propositions is sensitive to a judge parameter, facilitating cases whereby a proposition can be true relative to one judge, but false relative to another. Most prominently, semantic relativism has been applied to predicates of personal tastes (PPTs). Recently, Lasersohn [2007. "Expressives, Perspective and Presupposition." Theoretical Linguistics 33 (2): 223–230; 2017. Subjectivity and Perspective in Truth-Theoretic Semantics. Oxford: Oxford University Press] has urged an extension of semantic relativism to terms traditionally construed as expressives including derogatory epithets (e.g. 'asshole') and, more tentatively, expressions like 'damn'. In this paper, we challenge Lasersohn's extension of relativism. Section 1 gives a background on semantic theories for expressives and on semantic relativism. In Section 2, we focus on Lasersohn's [2007. "Expressives, Perspective and Presupposition." Theoretical Linguistics 33 (2): 223–230] account where he attempts to apply relativism to a wider range of expressives. We argue that because PPTs and expressives have fundamentally different semantic functions, the prospects for a relativistic account are slim. Several problems are presented. Our focus is on the perspective sensitivity of expressive content and the phenomenon of projection failure, as both reveal a fundamental disparity between expressives and PPTs.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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      src: R
    language: English
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