A Loosely Wittgensteinian Conception of the Linguistic Understanding of Large Language Models like BERT, GPT-3, and ChatGPT.

In this article, I develop a loosely Wittgensteinian conception of what it takes for a being, including an AI system, to understand language, and I suggest that current state of the art systems are closer to fulfilling these requirements than one might think. Developing and defending this claim has...

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Publicado en:Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol. 99; no. 4; pp. 485 - 524
Autor principal: Gubelmann, Reto
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Brill Academic Publishers 2022
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Gubelmann, Reto
        affil: University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland
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        Language models
        Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
        ChatGPT
        Turing test
        Artificial intelligence
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          Language models
          Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 1889-1951
          ChatGPT
          Turing test
          Artificial intelligence
      keyword:
        neural networks
        Searle
        understanding
        Wittgenstein
      ab: In this article, I develop a loosely Wittgensteinian conception of what it takes for a being, including an AI system, to understand language, and I suggest that current state of the art systems are closer to fulfilling these requirements than one might think. Developing and defending this claim has both empirical and conceptual aspects. The conceptual aspects concern the criteria that are reasonably applied when judging whether some being understands language; the empirical aspects concern the question whether a given being fulfills these criteria. On the conceptual side, the article builds on Glock's concept of intelligence, Taylor's conception of intrinsic rightness as well as Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. On the empirical side, it is argued that current transformer-based NNLP models, such as BERT and GPT-3 come close to fulfilling these criteria.
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    language: English
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