Solving the Authority Problem: Why We Won't Debate You, Bro.

Public arguments can be good or bad not only as a matter of logic, but also in the sense that speakers can do good or bad things with arguments. For example, hate speakers use public arguments to contribute to the subordination of their targets. But how can ordinary speakers acquire the authority to...

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Publicado en:Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy Vol. 42; no. 2; pp. 469 - 481
Autor principal: Cousens, Chris
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Apr2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Solving the Authority Problem: Why We Won't Debate You, Bro.
      aug:
        au: Cousens, Chris
        affil: The University of Stirling, FK94LA, Stirling, Scotland, UK
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        Oxford University Press
        Problem solving
        Speech
        Argument
        Hate
      sug:
        subj:
          Oxford University Press
          Problem solving
          Speech
          Argument
          Hate
      keyword:
        Authority
        Hate speech
        No-platforming
        Oppression
        Speech acts
      ab: Public arguments can be good or bad not only as a matter of logic, but also in the sense that speakers can do good or bad things with arguments. For example, hate speakers use public arguments to contribute to the subordination of their targets. But how can ordinary speakers acquire the authority to perform subordinating speech acts? This is the 'Authority Problem'. This paper defends a solution inspired by McGowan's (Australas J Philos 87:389–407, 2009) analysis of oppressive speech, including against concerns raised by McGowan (Just words: On speech and hidden harm, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2019) herself. A deflated kind of authority can be gained from the hate speaker's standing in a norm-governed 'activity of oppression'. We should be wary about engaging with such speakers in public argument. Even if we counter their arguments, we may still elevate their standing within that activity and so enable them to perform more pernicious speech acts than was previously possible.
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    language: English
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