Nothing to Come in a Relativistic Setting.
In the first part of the paper, we show that C&R's axioms generate the following dilemma. On the one hand, they could admit that truths about future contingents have no real ground in reality. To reject the requirement of grounding, however, goes against the intuitions of most philosophers concernin...
| Publicado en: | Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy Vol. 13; no. 63; pp. 433 - 445 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Paradigm Publishing Services
Dec2021
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=163368602&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 163368602 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 0873626X 1CM2 jtl: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy issn: 0873626X maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2021 vid: 13 iid: 63 pid: 35924 pub: Paradigm Publishing Services artinfo: ui: 163368602 10.2478/disp-2021-0025 ppf: 433 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 533KB tig: atl: Nothing to Come in a Relativistic Setting. aug: au: Dorato, Mauro Hoefer, Carl affil: Roma Tre University ICREA & University of Barcelona su: Axioms Logic Generalization Presentism (Philosophy) Philosophy of time sug: subj: Axioms Logic Generalization Presentism (Philosophy) Philosophy of time keyword: bivalence ground growing block theory permanentism temporarysm ab: In the first part of the paper, we show that C&R's axioms generate the following dilemma. On the one hand, they could admit that truths about future contingents have no real ground in reality. To reject the requirement of grounding, however, goes against the intuitions of most philosophers concerning truth. On the other hand, C&R could give up bivalence for future contingents at the cost of making their temporal logic more complicated and presumably losing certain theorems. In the second part, we evaluate C&R's relativistic generalization of the growing block by discussing the various options that can be used to make relativity cohere with the growing block, and we illustrate the reasons why Stein's "pointy present" looks preferable to bow-tie presentism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy is the property of Paradigm Publishing Services and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Disputatio: International Journal of Philosophy holder: Paradigm Publishing Services dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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