Enduring and Perduring Objects in Minkowski Space-Time.

I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out,...

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Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 99; no. 2; pp. 129 - 167
Autor principal: Balashov, Yuri
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature May2000
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        Special relativity (Physics)
        Ontology
        Spacetime
        Relativity (Physics)
        Metaphysics
        Philosophy
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          Special relativity (Physics)
          Ontology
          Spacetime
          Relativity (Physics)
          Metaphysics
          Philosophy
      ab: I examine the issue of persistence over time in thecontext of the special theory of relativity (SR). Thefour-dimensional ontology of perduring objects isclearly favored by SR. But it is a different questionif and to what extent this ontology is required, andthe rival endurantist ontology ruled out, by thistheory. In addressing this question, I take theessential idea of endurantism, that objects are whollypresent at single moments of time, and argue that itcommits one to unacceptable conclusions regardingcoexistence, in the context of SR. I then propose anddiscuss a plausible account of coexistence forperduring objects, which is free of these defects. This leaves the endurantist room for some maneuvers. I consider them and show that they do not really helpthe endurantist out. She can accommodate the notionof coexistence in the relativistic framework only atthe cost of renouncing central endurantist intuitions.
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