Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account.
Judgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories, viz. observer memories, that seems to threaten IEM. In the resulting debate, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed b...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy & Phenomenological Research Vol. 106; no. 2; pp. 299 - 324 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Mar2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=163605073&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 163605073 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318205 PPO jtl: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research issn: 00318205 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Mar2023 vid: 106 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 163605073 10.1111/phpr.12850 ppf: 299 ppct: 25 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 512KB tig: atl: Immunity to error through misidentification in observer memories: A moderate separatist account. aug: au: Perrin, Denis McCarroll, Christopher Jude affil: Institute of Philosophy in Grenoble, Centre for Philosophy of Memory, Université Grenoble Alpes Institute for Philosophy II, Ruhr‐Universität Bochum Institute of Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, National Yang Ming Chiao Tung University su: Episodic memory Empirical research Separatists Religious dissenters Memory sug: subj: Episodic memory Empirical research Separatists Religious dissenters Memory keyword: episodic memory immunity to error through misidentification intentional content observer memory phenomenal content separatism ab: Judgments based on episodic memory are often thought to be immune to errors of misidentification (IEM). Yet there is a certain category of episodic memories, viz. observer memories, that seems to threaten IEM. In the resulting debate, some say that observer memories are a threat to the IEM enjoyed by episodic memory (Michaelian, 2021); others say that they pose no such threat (Fernández, 2021; Lin, 2020). In this paper, we argue for a middle way. First, we frame the debate, claiming that the existing literature lacks a satisfying definition both of observer memories and of the precise issue of errors of identification in such memories. Then, we contribute to the debate by challenging an anti‐separatist view about the relation between phenomenal and intentional features of observer memories that looms behind this debate. On this view, if the rememberer's self is a phenomenal feature of the memory, by implication it is also built into the intentional content. We reject this view and offer a moderate separatist account. Distinguishing between empirically‐grounded species of observer memories, we say that the phenomenal self sometimes is, and sometimes is not built into the intentional content of the memory, and this results in different implications for IEM. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy & Phenomenological Research is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy & Phenomenological Research holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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