Conspiracy theories and clinical decision‐making.

When a patient's treatment decisions are the product of delusion, this is often taken as a paradigmatic case of undermined decisional capacity. That is to say, when a patient refuses treatment on the basis of beliefs that in no way reflect reality, clinicians and ethicists tend to agree that their r...

Descripción completa

Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Bioethics Vol. 37; no. 5; pp. 470 - 478
Autor principal: Stout, Nathan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
fields @attributes:
  recordID: 1
pdfLink:
plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=163821637&site=ehost-live
header:
  @attributes:
    shortDbName: ssf
    uiTerm: 163821637
    longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson)
    uiTag: AN
  controlInfo:
    bkinfo:
    jinfo:
      jid:
        02699702
        6PJ
      jtl: Bioethics
      issn: 02699702
      maglogo: Y
    pubinfo:
      dt: Jun2023
      vid: 37
      iid: 5
      pid: 480
      pub: Wiley-Blackwell
    artinfo:
      ui:
        163821637
        10.1111/bioe.13146
      ppf: 470
      ppct: 8
      formats:
      tig:
        atl: Conspiracy theories and clinical decision‐making.
      aug:
        au: Stout, Nathan
        affil: Department of Clinical Ethics, University Hospitals, Cleveland Medical Center, Cleveland OH, , USA
      su:
        Social theory
        Psychology
        Attitudes toward illness
        Health attitudes
        Bioethics
        Antibiotics
        Patient refusal of treatment
        Delusions
        Hospital emergency services
        COVID-19
        Patient decision making
        Capacity (Law)
        Conceptual structures
        Infection
        Theory
        Decision making in clinical medicine
        Wound care
      sug:
        subj:
          Social theory
          Psychology
          Attitudes toward illness
          Health attitudes
          Bioethics
          Pharmaceutical and medicine manufacturing
          Medicinal and Botanical Manufacturing
          Pharmaceuticals and pharmacy supplies merchant wholesalers
          Drugs and Druggists' Sundries Merchant Wholesalers
          Research and Development in the Physical, Engineering, and Life Sciences (except Biotechnology)
          Antibiotics
          Patient refusal of treatment
          Delusions
          Hospital emergency services
          COVID-19
          Patient decision making
          Capacity (Law)
          Conceptual structures
          Infection
          Theory
          Decision making in clinical medicine
          Wound care
      keyword:
        clinical ethics
        conspiracy theories
        decision‐making capacity
        clinical ethics
        conspiracy theories
        decision‐making capacity
      ab: When a patient's treatment decisions are the product of delusion, this is often taken as a paradigmatic case of undermined decisional capacity. That is to say, when a patient refuses treatment on the basis of beliefs that in no way reflect reality, clinicians and ethicists tend to agree that their refusal is not valid. During the COVID‐19 pandemic, however, we have witnessed many patients refuse potentially life‐saving interventions not based on delusion but on conspiracy beliefs. Importantly, many of the beliefs espoused by conspiracy theorists resemble delusions in a number of relevant ways. For instance, conspiracy beliefs often posit states of affairs that could not possibly exist in the world, they are recalcitrant in the face of disconfirming evidence, and they tend to put the believer in a state of paranoia. Given these similarities, how should we think about conspiracy theorists' capacity for making clinical decisions? In this paper, I attempt to answer this question by first offering an account of just what makes some set of beliefs count as a conspiracy theory. Second, I attempt to disambiguate conspiracy beliefs from delusions by exploring important conceptual and psychological features of both. Finally, I apply standard criteria for assessing a patient's decision‐making capacity to instances of conspiracy beliefs and argue that, although the picture is muddy, there may be cases in which conspiracy beliefs undermine capacity. I end by exploring the implications that this might have for surrogate decision‐making and addressing potential objections.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
      doctype: Article
      src: R
    language: English
    refInfo:
    copyright:
      @attributes:
        flag: N
    holdings:
      @attributes:
        islocal: N