How (not) to think about theory-change in epidemiology.
My purpose in this paper is to show how a re-examination of Snow's famous South London water study (1853–1854), widely taken to have established that cholera is water-borne, highlights some problems with current, scientific realist accounts of theory-change. When examining scientific controversies,...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 2569 - 2589 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
May2021 Supplement 10
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=163885788&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 163885788 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: May2021 Supplement 10 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 163885788 10.1007/s11229-019-02135-7 ppf: 2569 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 560KB tig: atl: How (not) to think about theory-change in epidemiology. aug: au: Tulodziecki, Dana affil: Department of Philosophy, Purdue University, Beering Hall 7132, 100 N. University St., 47907-2098, West Lafayette, IN, USA su: Epidemiology Scientific development History of science Cholera sug: subj: Epidemiology Scientific development History of science Cholera keyword: E.A. Parkes John Snow Miasma theory of disease Philosophy of epidemiology Scientific anti-realism Scientific controversies Scientific progress Scientific realism Theory-change ab: My purpose in this paper is to show how a re-examination of Snow's famous South London water study (1853–1854), widely taken to have established that cholera is water-borne, highlights some problems with current, scientific realist accounts of theory-change. When examining scientific controversies, such accounts focus disproportionately on the 'winning' theories and their properties, or on those of the reasoning of the scientists who proposed them. I argue that this focus is misguided and leads us to neglect much of what is epistemically valuable in episodes of theory-change, thereby leading to inaccurate views about both the dynamics of theory-change and the notion of scientific progress that accompanies it. I end by sketching some implications for the philosophy of epidemiology. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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