Infinite Aggregation and Risk.
Aggregative theories of moral value have difficulty in ranking worlds that each contain infinitely many valuable events. And, although there are several existing proposals for doing so, few provide a cardinal measure of each world's value. This raises the even greater challenge of ranking lotteries...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 101; no. 2; pp. 340 - 360 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=163976921&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 163976921 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 101 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 163976921 10.1080/00048402.2021.2013265 ppf: 340 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.4MB tig: atl: Infinite Aggregation and Risk. aug: au: Wilkinson, Hayden affil: Australian National University su: Axioms Values (Ethics) Lotteries Decision theory Ranking sug: subj: Axioms Values (Ethics) Lotteries Decision theory Ranking keyword: aggregation ex ante Pareto expected value theory infinite utility streams infinite value stochastic dominance ab: Aggregative theories of moral value have difficulty in ranking worlds that each contain infinitely many valuable events. And, although there are several existing proposals for doing so, few provide a cardinal measure of each world's value. This raises the even greater challenge of ranking lotteries over such worlds: without cardinal values, we cannot apply expected value theory. How, then, can we compare such lotteries? To date, we have just one method for doing so (proposed separately by Arntzenius, Bostrom, and Meacham), which is to compare the prospects for value at each individual location, and then to represent and compare lotteries by their expected values at each of those locations. But, as I show here, this approach violates several key principles of decision theory and generates some implausible verdicts. I propose an alternative—one that delivers plausible rankings of lotteries, which is implied by a plausible collection of axioms, and that can be applied alongside almost any ranking of infinite worlds. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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