The Statistical Riddle of Induction.
With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some 'natural' properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive in...
| Publicado en: | Australasian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 101; no. 2; pp. 313 - 327 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jun2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=163976922&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 163976922 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00048402 BHK jtl: Australasian Journal of Philosophy issn: 00048402 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 101 iid: 2 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 163976922 10.1080/00048402.2021.2013909 ppf: 313 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.9MB tig: atl: The Statistical Riddle of Induction. aug: au: Johannesson, Eric affil: Stockholm University su: Statistical sampling Probability theory Classical statistics Scientists Bayesian analysis sug: subj: Statistical sampling Probability theory Classical statistics Scientists Bayesian analysis keyword: induction probability random sampling statistics ab: With his new riddle of induction, Goodman raised a problem for enumerative induction which many have taken to show that only some 'natural' properties can be used for making inductive inferences. Arguably, however, (i) enumerative induction is not a method that scientists use for making inductive inferences in the first place. Moreover, it seems at first sight that (ii) Goodman's problem does not affect the method that scientists actually use for making such inferences—namely, classical statistics. Taken together, this would indicate that (iii) 'naturalness' is not such a relevant concept for the problem of induction, after all. I have no objections against (i) and (iii). But, contrary to (ii), I argue that classical statistics does face a version of Goodman's problem, which I call the statistical riddle of induction. Given that his problem merely is an instance of the more general problem of underdetermination, this is hardly surprising. Perhaps more importantly, I also show how my riddle can be used for exposing a common fallacy in probabilistic reasoning, without relying on Bayesian assumptions. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Australasian Journal of Philosophy is the property of Taylor & Francis Ltd and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Australasian Journal of Philosophy holder: Taylor & Francis Ltd dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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