Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit?
I compare two different systems of provision of binary public goods: a centralized system, operated by a benevolent government that has limited commitment power; and a decentralized system, based on voluntary contributions, where agents can communicate but cannot write contracts. I show that any ex‐...
| Publicado en: | Economic Inquiry Vol. 61; no. 3; pp. 720 - 738 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=163991321&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 163991321 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00952583 EIQ jtl: Economic Inquiry issn: 00952583 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2023 vid: 61 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 163991321 10.1111/ecin.13138 ppf: 720 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 761KB tig: atl: Should a benevolent government provide public goods if it cannot commit? aug: au: Silva, Francisco affil: Department of Economics, Deakin Business School, Burwood Victoria, , Australia su: Public goods Common good Public spending sug: subj: Public goods Common good Public spending Public Finance Activities keyword: commitment power communication free‐riding voluntary provision of public goods commitment power communication free‐riding voluntary provision of public goods ab: I compare two different systems of provision of binary public goods: a centralized system, operated by a benevolent government that has limited commitment power; and a decentralized system, based on voluntary contributions, where agents can communicate but cannot write contracts. I show that any ex‐post individually rational allocation that is implementable by the centralized system is also implementable by the decentralized system. This suggests that when the public good provision problem is merely an informational one, as is the case with binary public goods, a decentralized system may perform better. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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