Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans.

If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad ans...

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Publicado en:Pacific Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 104; no. 2; pp. 301 - 324
Autor principal: Roelofs, Luke
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2023
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Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: Sentientism, Motivation, and Philosophical Vulcans.
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        au: Roelofs, Luke
        affil: Center for Mind Brain and Consciousness, New York University, , USA
      su:
        Motivation (Psychology)
        Consciousness
        Pleasure
        Suffering
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        subj:
          Motivation (Psychology)
          Consciousness
          Pleasure
          Suffering
      ab: If moral status depends on the capacity for consciousness, what kind of consciousness matters exactly? Two popular answers are that any kind of consciousness matters (Broad Sentientism), and that what matters is the capacity for pleasure and suffering (Narrow Sentientism). I argue that the broad answer is too broad, while the narrow answer is likely too narrow, as Chalmers has recently argued by appeal to 'philosophical Vulcans'. I defend a middle position, Motivational Sentientism, on which what matters is motivating consciousness: any kind of consciousness which presents its subject with reasons for action.
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