Brentano on Act, Content and Intentionality.
This article offers a reconstruction of Brentano's notion of act content that identifies the content of a mental act with a combination of marks (Merkmale) or a single such mark. The author will first clarify the role act content plays in Brentano's philosophy of psychology and then go on to locate...
| Publicado en: | Grazer Philosophische Studien Vol. 100; no. 1/2; pp. 173 - 197 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Brill Academic Publishers
2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | This article offers a reconstruction of Brentano's notion of act content that identifies the content of a mental act with a combination of marks (Merkmale) or a single such mark. The author will first clarify the role act content plays in Brentano's philosophy of psychology and then go on to locate the proposed notion of content in the historical context of Brentano's work as well as in his writings at the time of Psychologie. The author will defend this notion against potential objections and explore its explanatory potential. |
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