Do Unjust States Have the Standing to Blame? Three Reservations About Scepticism.
If an offender was treated unjustly by her state in a way that curtailed her options or otherwise made it more likely she would commit her crime, does her state have the moral standing to blame her for that crime? Many theorists have expressed scepticism that the state does. I present three reservat...
| Publicado en: | Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 43; no. 2; pp. 249 - 273 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Summer2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164129257&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164129257 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01436503 BJ4 jtl: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies issn: 01436503 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Summer2023 vid: 43 iid: 2 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 164129257 10.1093/ojls/gqac031 ppf: 249 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 195KB tig: atl: Do Unjust States Have the Standing to Blame? Three Reservations About Scepticism. aug: au: Ewing, Benjamin affil: Assistant Professor, Queen's University Faculty of Law , Kingston, ON , Canada su: Justice & ethics Criminals Criminal law Blame Skepticism Shakur, Tupac, 1971-1996 Prison sentences sug: subj: Justice & ethics Criminals Criminal law Blame Skepticism Shakur, Tupac, 1971-1996 Prison sentences keyword: complicity condemnation criminogenic injustice disadvantaged offenders hard treatment standing to blame ab: If an offender was treated unjustly by her state in a way that curtailed her options or otherwise made it more likely she would commit her crime, does her state have the moral standing to blame her for that crime? Many theorists have expressed scepticism that the state does. I present three reservations about such scepticism. First, much of it appears to derive its intuitive appeal from problems with the content of state condemnation that can be solved by changing its content rather than its source. Second, adequate legal recognition of everyone's fundamental moral rights arguably requires not merely the proscription of violations of those rights, but authoritative public condemnation of such violations, which only the state is capable of supplying. Finally, an unjust state would not do disadvantaged offenders any favours by holding its tongue—nor would such offenders help themselves by closing their ears to its criticism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Oxford University Press. item: Oxford Journal of Legal Studies holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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