A Dilemma for Solomonoff Prediction.

The framework of Solomonoff prediction assigns prior probability to hypotheses inversely proportional to their Kolmogorov complexity. There are two well-known problems. First, the Solomonoff prior is relative to a choice of universal Turing machine. Second, the Solomonoff prior is not computable. Ho...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 90; no. 2; pp. 288 - 307
Main Author: Neth, Sven
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Apr2023
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        atl: A Dilemma for Solomonoff Prediction.
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        au: Neth, Sven
        affil: University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA, US
      su:
        Kolmogorov complexity
        Turing machines
        Dilemma
        Forecasting
      sug:
        subj:
          Kolmogorov complexity
          Turing machines
          Dilemma
          Forecasting
      ab: The framework of Solomonoff prediction assigns prior probability to hypotheses inversely proportional to their Kolmogorov complexity. There are two well-known problems. First, the Solomonoff prior is relative to a choice of universal Turing machine. Second, the Solomonoff prior is not computable. However, there are responses to both problems. Different Solomonoff priors converge with more and more data. Further, there are computable approximations to the Solomonoff prior. I argue that there is a tension between these two responses. This is because computable approximations to Solomonoff prediction do not always converge.
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