Thin Mereological Sums, Abstraction, and Interpretational Modalities.
Some tools introduced by Linnebo to show that mathematical entities are thin objects can also be applied to non‐mathematical entities, which have been thought to be thin as well for a variety of reasons. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties and opportunities concerning the application of abstr...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 89; no. 3; pp. 338 - 356 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164230711&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164230711 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 89 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 164230711 10.1111/theo.12392 ppf: 338 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 251KB tig: atl: Thin Mereological Sums, Abstraction, and Interpretational Modalities. aug: au: Lando, Giorgio affil: Dipartimento di Scienze Umane, Università degli Studi dell'Aquila su: Whole & parts (Philosophy) Metaphysics Modal logic Set theory Mathematics theorems sug: subj: Whole & parts (Philosophy) Metaphysics Modal logic Set theory Mathematics theorems keyword: abstraction criteria of identity mereology ontological commitment ab: Some tools introduced by Linnebo to show that mathematical entities are thin objects can also be applied to non‐mathematical entities, which have been thought to be thin as well for a variety of reasons. In this paper, I discuss some difficulties and opportunities concerning the application of abstraction and interpretational modalities to mereological sums. In particular, I show that on one hand some prima facie attractive candidates for the role of an explanatory plural abstraction principle for mereological sums (in terms of pluralities of summed entities) are not really explanatory; on the other hand, singular abstraction principles (in terms of single summed entities) are materially inadequate. Nonetheless, explanatory criteria of identity and conditions of existence for mereological sums are provided by classical extensional mereology independent of abstraction principles. Thus, given classical extensional mereology, the reasons why, according to Linnebo, mathematical abstracted entities are thin also hold for mereological sums. Finally, I contend that interpretational modalities can be used to characterise the process by which a subject adds sums of previously admitted entities to the domain of quantification. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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