A Nominalist Alternative to Reference by Abstraction.
In his recent book Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo (2018) argues for the existence of a hierarchy of abstract objects, sufficient to model ZFC, via a novel and highly interesting argument that relies on a process called dynamic abstraction. This paper presents a way for a nominalist, someone opposed t...
| Publicado en: | Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy Vol. 89; no. 3; pp. 326 - 338 |
|---|---|
| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2023
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164230712&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164230712 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00405825 HL0 jtl: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy issn: 00405825 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 89 iid: 3 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 164230712 10.1111/theo.12399 ppf: 326 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 191KB tig: atl: A Nominalist Alternative to Reference by Abstraction. aug: au: Pearce, Gareth Rhys affil: Faculty for Philosophy, University of Vienna, Universitätsstraße 7, Vienna 1010, , Austria su: Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account (Book) Linnebo, Oystein Modal logic Set theory Mathematics theorems sug: subj: Thin Objects: An Abstractionist Account (Book) Linnebo, Oystein Modal logic Set theory Mathematics theorems keyword: nominalism philosophy of mathematics reference by abstraction thin objects ab: In his recent book Thin Objects, Øystein Linnebo (2018) argues for the existence of a hierarchy of abstract objects, sufficient to model ZFC, via a novel and highly interesting argument that relies on a process called dynamic abstraction. This paper presents a way for a nominalist, someone opposed to the existence of abstract objects, to avoid Linnebo's conclusion by rejecting his claim that certain abstraction principles are sufficient for reference (RBA). Section 1 of the paper explains Linnebo's argument for RBA. It offers a reading of Linnebo's work upon which he has two arguments for RBA: one deductive and one abductive, and argues that whilst the deductive argument is unsound the abductive one is prima facie plausible. The nominalist must therefore find a way to respond to the abductive argument. Section 2 outlines just such a response, by offering an alternative explanation of the cases Linnebo wishes to argue from. Most interestingly, it shows that abstraction in Linnebo's most difficult case (the "reference to ordinary bodies" case) can be achieved using mereological means, rather than relying on RBA. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Theoria: A Swedish Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|