Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future.
Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an expla...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 5/6; pp. 1717 - 1743 |
|---|---|
| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
| Publicado: |
Springer Nature
Jun2023
|
| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164307487&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164307487 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 180 iid: 5/6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164307487 10.1007/s11098-023-01940-8 ppf: 1717 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 794KB tig: atl: Why do people represent time as dynamical? An investigation of temporal dynamism and the open future. aug: au: Latham, Andrew J. Miller, Kristie affil: Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Aarhus, Denmark Department of Philosophy, The University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia su: Metaphysics Deflationary theory of truth Hypothesis Indeterminism (Philosophy) Mathematics sug: subj: Metaphysics Deflationary theory of truth Hypothesis Indeterminism (Philosophy) Mathematics keyword: A-theory B-theory Naive theory Temporal dynamism Time ab: Deflationists hold that it does not seem to us, in experience, as though time robustly passes. There is some recent empirical evidence that appears to support this contention. Equally, empirical evidence suggests that we naïvely represent time as dynamical. Thus deflationists are faced with an explanatory burden. If, as they maintain, the world seems to us in experience as though it is non-dynamical, then why do we represent time as dynamical? This paper takes up the challenge of investigating, on the part of the deflationist, one candidate explanation. We hypothesise that people's belief that the future is what we call deliberatively open partly explains why they represent time as dynamical. In a series of two experiments we test this hypothesis. We find no evidence that beliefs about deliberative openness explain why people represent time as dynamical. Hence there remains an explanatory burden for the deflationist to discharge. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
|---|