Fineness of grain and the hylomorphism of experience.
A central objection to McDowell’s conceptualism about empirical content concerns the fine-grained phenomenology of experience, which supposedly entails that the actual content of experience cannot be matched in its particularity by our concepts. While McDowell himself has answered this objection in...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 201; no. 6; pp. 1 - 30 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jun2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164316472&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164316472 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 201 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164316472 10.1007/s11229-023-04201-7 ppf: 1 ppct: 29 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 364KB tig: atl: Fineness of grain and the hylomorphism of experience. aug: au: Settegast, Sascha affil: Department of Medical Oncology, Section of Translational Medical Ethics, National Center for Tumor Diseases, Heidelberg University Hospital, Im Neuenheimer Feld 460, 69120, Heidelberg, Germany sug: keyword: Capacities Conceptualism Empirical content Experience Fineness of grain Hylomorphism Idealism McDowell Non-conceptualism Perception Phenomenology ab: A central objection to McDowell’s conceptualism about empirical content concerns the fine-grained phenomenology of experience, which supposedly entails that the actual content of experience cannot be matched in its particularity by our concepts. While McDowell himself has answered this objection in recourse to the possibility of demonstrative concepts, his reply has engendered a plethora of further objections and is widely considered inadequate. I believe that McDowell’s critics underestimate the true force of his reply because they tend to read unrecognized empiricist presuppositions into his account of experience. To show this, I introduce a new hylomorphic reading of McDowell’s account of experience and argue that the objections to his reply all rest on a specific empiricist assumption, which is untenable because it conflates the form of experience with its content. Consequently, conceptualism so understood can resist all of these objections, as I attempt to show by systematizing and answering them. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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