Backwards from zero: How the U.S. public evaluates the use of zero-day vulnerabilities in cybersecurity.
Zero-day vulnerabilities are software and hardware flaws that are unknown to computer vendors. As powerful means of carrying out cyber intrusions, such vulnerabilities present a dilemma for governments. Actors that develop or procure such vulnerabilities may retain them for future use; alternatively...
| Publicado en: | Contemporary Security Policy Vol. 44; no. 3; pp. 437 - 462 |
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| Autores principales: | , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Taylor & Francis Ltd
Jul2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164355724&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164355724 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 13523260 RHJ jtl: Contemporary Security Policy issn: 13523260 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2023 vid: 44 iid: 3 pid: 377 pub: Taylor & Francis Ltd artinfo: ui: 164355724 10.1080/13523260.2023.2216112 ppf: 437 ppct: 25 formats: tig: atl: Backwards from zero: How the U.S. public evaluates the use of zero-day vulnerabilities in cybersecurity. aug: au: Leal, Marcelo M. Musgrave, Paul affil: Department of Political Science and Legal Studies, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, MA, USA su: Internet security Computer security vulnerabilities Public opinion Dilemma sug: subj: Internet security Computer security vulnerabilities Public opinion Dilemma keyword: cybersecurity policy public opinion vulnerabilities equities process Zero-day vulnerabilities ab: Zero-day vulnerabilities are software and hardware flaws that are unknown to computer vendors. As powerful means of carrying out cyber intrusions, such vulnerabilities present a dilemma for governments. Actors that develop or procure such vulnerabilities may retain them for future use; alternatively, agencies possessing such vulnerabilities may disclose the flaws to affected vendors so they can be patched, thereby denying vulnerabilities not only to adversaries but also themselves. Previous research has explored the ethics and implications of this dilemma, but no study has investigated public opinion regarding zero-day exploits. We present results from a survey experiment testing whether conditions identified as important in the literature influence respondents' support for disclosing or stockpiling zero-day vulnerabilities. Our results show that respondents overwhelmingly support disclosure, a conclusion only weakly affected by the likelihood that an adversary will independently discover the vulnerability. Our findings suggest a gap between public preferences and current U.S. policy. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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