Meta-uncertainty and the proof paradoxes.
Various real and imagined criminal law cases rest on "naked statistical evidence". That is, they rest more or less entirely on a probability for guilt/liability derived from a single statistical model. The intuition is that there is something missing in these cases, high as the probability for guilt...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 180; no. 7; pp. 1927 - 1951 |
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| Main Authors: | , |
| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jul2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164372077&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164372077 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2023 vid: 180 iid: 7 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164372077 10.1007/s11098-023-01951-5 ppf: 1927 ppct: 24 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 749KB tig: atl: Meta-uncertainty and the proof paradoxes. aug: au: Steele, Katie Colyvan, Mark affil: School of Philosophy, Australian National University, 2600, Canberra, ACT, Australia Department of Philosophy, University of Sydney, A14 Main, Quadrangle, 2006, Sydney, NSW, Australia su: Criminal law Statistical models Statistical evidence (Law) Legal evidence Probabilism sug: subj: Criminal law Statistical models Statistical evidence (Law) Legal evidence Probabilism keyword: Legal probabilism Meta-uncertainty Proof paradoxes Statistical evidence ab: Various real and imagined criminal law cases rest on "naked statistical evidence". That is, they rest more or less entirely on a probability for guilt/liability derived from a single statistical model. The intuition is that there is something missing in these cases, high as the probability for guilt/liability may be, such that the relevant standard for legal proof is not met. Here we contribute to the considerable debate about how this intuition is best explained and what it teaches us about evidential reasoning in the legal setting. We part ways with the recent scholarship, however. Unlike most others, our diagnosis is not that there is an important qualitative property that some evidence or bodies of evidence have, and that naked statistical evidence, most strikingly, lacks. Rather, we see cases resting on naked statistical evidence as lying at the extreme of a continuum of cases that are vulnerable to challenge due to "meta-uncertainty" about the underlying model. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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