Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience.
Interpretations abound about Husserl's understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to f...
| Publicado en: | Husserl Studies Vol. 39; no. 2; pp. 161 - 179 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164433115&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164433115 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01679848 OG6 jtl: Husserl Studies issn: 01679848 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2023 vid: 39 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164433115 10.1007/s10743-023-09324-w ppf: 161 ppct: 18 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 842KB tig: atl: Phenomenological Reduction and the Nature of Perceptual Experience. aug: au: Bower, Matt E. M. affil: Department of Philosophy, Texas State University, 601 University Drive, Comal Hall 102, 78666, San Marcos, TX, United States su: Realism Hallucinations Skepticism sug: subj: Realism Hallucinations Skepticism ab: Interpretations abound about Husserl's understanding of the relationship between veridical perceptual experience and hallucination. Some read him as taking the two to share the same distinctive essential nature, like contemporary conjunctivists. Others find in Husserl grounds for taking the two to fall into basically distinct categories of experience, like disjunctivists. There is ground for skepticism, however, about whether Husserl's view could possibly fall under either of these headings. Husserl, on the one hand, operates under the auspices of the phenomenological reduction, abstaining from use of any epistemic commitments about mind-transcendent reality, whereas conjunctive and disjunctive accounts of perceptual experience, on the other hand, are both premised on some form of metaphysical realism. There seems to be a basic incompatibility between the former approach and the latter. I examine this line of thinking and argue that the incompatibility is only apparent. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Husserl Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Husserl Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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