Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections.
In recent years, a variety of countries worldwide have experienced an increase in executive power. Long‐standing concerns about this concentration include reduced property rights protection. Particularly for developing democracies, scholars theorize that a lack of institutional constraints on the ex...
| Published in: | Presidential Studies Quarterly Vol. 53; no. 2; pp. 273 - 293 |
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| Main Authors: | , , |
| Format: | Article |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2023
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=164481163&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 164481163 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 03604918 PRQ jtl: Presidential Studies Quarterly issn: 03604918 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 53 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 164481163 10.1111/psq.12822 ppf: 273 ppct: 20 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 296KB tig: atl: Institutional constraints on the executive, investment, and elections. aug: au: Canes‐Wrone, Brandice Ponce de León, Christian Thieme, Sebastian affil: Department of Political Science and Hoover Institution, Stanford University, California, Stanford, USA Politics and International Relations, Tecnológico de Monterrey, Mexico City, Mexico Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse, Toulouse, France su: Investments Elections Property rights Public institutions Executive power Voter turnout sug: subj: Investments Elections Property rights Public institutions Executive Offices Miscellaneous Financial Investment Activities Investment Advice Executive power Voter turnout keyword: electoral cycles executive power institutional constraints electoral cycles executive power institutional constraints ab: In recent years, a variety of countries worldwide have experienced an increase in executive power. Long‐standing concerns about this concentration include reduced property rights protection. Particularly for developing democracies, scholars theorize that a lack of institutional constraints on the executive may impede long‐term investment. Analyzing this question empirically has proven difficult, however, because economic activity can affect political institutions and behavior. This article, which analyzes four decades of data from 57 developing democracies, addresses the identification challenges by leveraging elections as a source of exogenous turnover and by accounting for the potential endogeneity of executive institutions. Consistent with the argument that institutional constraints reassure investors, the results suggest that as constraints on the executive increase, investment is less affected by prospective electoral turnover. Moreover, the results are stronger for presidential and semi‐presidential systems with fixed elections, where the chief executive's term cannot be ended early by elections or the legislature, than for parliamentary systems. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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