Perceptual learning and reasons-responsiveness.

Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justif...

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Publicado en:Nous (0029-4624) Vol. 57; no. 2; pp. 481 - 509
Autor principal: Jenkin, Zoe
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Wiley-Blackwell Jun2023
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Jenkin, Zoe
        affil: Washington University, St. Louis, USA
      su:
        Optical illusions
        Refraction (Optics)
        Soluble glass
        Perceptual learning
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          Optical illusions
          Refraction (Optics)
          Soluble glass
          Perceptual learning
      ab: Perceptual experiences are not immediately responsive to reasons. You see a stick submerged in a glass of water as bent no matter how much you know about light refraction. Due to this isolation from reasons, perception is traditionally considered outside the scope of epistemic evaluability as justified or unjustified. Is perception really as independent from reasons as visual illusions make it out to be? I argue no, drawing on psychological evidence from perceptual learning. The flexibility of perceptual learning is a way of responding to new epistemic reasons. The resulting perceptual experiences are epistemically evaluable as justified or unjustified.
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