Explicating Exact versus Conceptual Replication.
What does it mean to replicate an experiment? A distinction is often drawn between 'exact' (or 'direct') and 'conceptual' replication. However, in recent work, Uljana Feest argues that the notion of replication in itself, whether exact or conceptual, is flawed due to the problem of systematic error,...
| Publicado en: | Erkenntnis Vol. 88; no. 6; pp. 2493 - 2515 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Aug2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164579323&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164579323 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 01650106 5KZ jtl: Erkenntnis issn: 01650106 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Aug2023 vid: 88 iid: 6 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164579323 10.1007/s10670-021-00464-z ppf: 2493 ppct: 22 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 552KB tig: atl: Explicating Exact versus Conceptual Replication. aug: au: Hudson, Robert affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Saskatchewan, 9 Campus Drive, S7N 5A5, Saskatoon, SK, Canada sug: ab: What does it mean to replicate an experiment? A distinction is often drawn between 'exact' (or 'direct') and 'conceptual' replication. However, in recent work, Uljana Feest argues that the notion of replication in itself, whether exact or conceptual, is flawed due to the problem of systematic error, and Edouard Machery argues that, although the notion of replication is not flawed, we should nevertheless dispense with the distinction between exact and conceptual replication. My plan in this paper is to defend the value of replication, along with the distinction between exact and conceptual replication, from the critiques of Feest and Machery. To that end, I provide an explication of conceptual replication, and distinguish it from what I call 'experimental' replication. On the basis, then, of a tripartite distinction between exact, experimental and conceptual replication, I argue in response to Feest that replication is still informative despite the prospect of systematic error. I also rebut Machery's claim that conceptual replication is fundamentally confused and wrongly conflates replication and extension, and in turn raise some objections to his own Resampling Account of replication. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Erkenntnis is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Erkenntnis holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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