Brentano on the individuation of mental acts.
This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not r...
| Publicado en: | European Journal of Philosophy Vol. 31; no. 2; pp. 431 - 445 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jun2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164586750&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164586750 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 09668373 7PU jtl: European Journal of Philosophy issn: 09668373 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jun2023 vid: 31 iid: 2 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 164586750 10.1111/ejop.12698 ppf: 431 ppct: 14 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 1.3MB tig: atl: Brentano on the individuation of mental acts. aug: au: Taieb, Hamid affil: Department of Philosophy, Humboldt University Berlin, Berlin, Germany su: Brentano, Franz Clemens, 1838-1917 Philosophy of psychology Tropes (Philosophy) Metaphor Cognition sug: subj: Brentano, Franz Clemens, 1838-1917 Philosophy of psychology Tropes (Philosophy) Metaphor Cognition ab: This paper aims to present and evaluate Brentano's account of the individuation of mental acts. In his early works, Brentano assimilated mental acts to tropes; however, he encountered difficulties in explaining their individuation, since the usual solutions for the individuation of tropes were not readily applicable to his theory of mental acts. In a later period, Brentano introduced into his psychology what he called the "soul," and this allowed him to explain the individuation of mental acts. Finally, after his "reistic" turn, he excluded mental acts from his ontology, for he rejected abstracta of any kind, including abstract particulars, and admitted only things, or res (in Latin), that is, concrete particulars; in his late philosophy, there are no "thinkings," but only "thinkers." However, he still needed to explain what individuates different thinkers, and this was again the soul. In the conclusion, the paper critically compares the different theoretical options considered by Brentano. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of European Journal of Philosophy is the property of Wiley-Blackwell and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: European Journal of Philosophy holder: Wiley-Blackwell dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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