The impact of social impact bond financing.
Social impact bonds (SIBs), also known as Pay for Success, are an innovation in Payment by Results contracting. Investors finance programs and are repaid based on the "SIB effect," which includes changes in outcomes attributable to financing. We generate a quantitative estimate of this part of the S...
| Publicado en: | Public Administration Review Vol. 83; no. 4; pp. 930 - 947 |
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| Autores principales: | , , , , |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Wiley-Blackwell
Jul2023
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| Materias: | |
| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=ssf&AN=164587763&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: ssf uiTerm: 164587763 longDbName: Social Sciences Full Text (H.W. Wilson) uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00333352 PBA jtl: Public Administration Review issn: 00333352 maglogo: Y pubinfo: dt: Jul2023 vid: 83 iid: 4 pid: 480 pub: Wiley-Blackwell artinfo: ui: 164587763 10.1111/puar.13631 ppf: 930 ppct: 17 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: C – @attributes: type: P size: 1.8MB tig: atl: The impact of social impact bond financing. aug: au: Hevenstone, Debra Fraser, Alec Hobi, Lukas Przepiorka, Wojtek Geuke, Gemma G. M. affil: Social Work, Bern University of Applied Sciences, Bern, Switzerland King's Business School, King's College London, London, UK Social and Behavioral Sciences, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands Department of Sociology, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands su: Netherlands Switzerland Investors Labor market Social impact bonds Stewardship theory Agency theory sug: subj: Investors Labor market Netherlands Switzerland Social impact bonds Stewardship theory Agency theory ab: Social impact bonds (SIBs), also known as Pay for Success, are an innovation in Payment by Results contracting. Investors finance programs and are repaid based on the "SIB effect," which includes changes in outcomes attributable to financing. We generate a quantitative estimate of this part of the SIB effect for two active labor market programs in the Netherlands and Switzerland. Comparing program impacts within providers using SIB and non‐SIB contracts suggests financing has positive impacts on public benefit receipt, employment, and income. Qualitative research suggests this is because SIB contracts increased pressure for all involved parties, leading to the institutionalization of selection and greater resources for SIB‐financed services. Contracts with high pressure, like SIBs, may compromise both performance requirements and the potential to measure performance. We examine the implications of these findings in relation to agency and stewardship theories and highlight the significance of SIBs as multilateral as opposed to bilateral contracts. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: N holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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