The Incompatibility of Perdurantism and Priority Monism.
In this paper, I argue that perdurantism is incompatible with priority monism: the view that the universal mereological fusion, U, is fundamental. For the monist's fundamental object can neither persist by being a trans-temporal object (i.e., a space-time 'worm') nor by being an instantaneous stage....
| Published in: | Philosophia Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 961 - 977 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Apr2023
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164659320&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164659320 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164659320 10.1007/s11406-022-00571-3 ppf: 961 ppct: 16 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 538KB tig: atl: The Incompatibility of Perdurantism and Priority Monism. aug: au: Taylor, Jamie affil: University of Durham, Durham, England su: Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy) Monism Pluralism Theory of knowledge Whole & parts (Philosophy) sug: subj: Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy) Monism Pluralism Theory of knowledge Whole & parts (Philosophy) keyword: monism perdurantism persistence temporal gunk ab: In this paper, I argue that perdurantism is incompatible with priority monism: the view that the universal mereological fusion, U, is fundamental. For the monist's fundamental object can neither persist by being a trans-temporal object (i.e., a space-time 'worm') nor by being an instantaneous stage. If U persisted via being a worm, it would be grounded in its temporal parts, meaning that it would not be fundamental as it would not be ungrounded. If U were a stage, on the other hand, it would face a problem from the possibility of 'temporal gunk'. But if U persisted by neither being a worm nor a stage, then U could not persist via having temporal parts, and thus perdurantism would be false. Given that a similar combination of perdurantism and priority pluralism also faces a problem from temporal gunk, I conclude that perdurantism does not sit well with mereological based accounts of fundamentality. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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