Autonomy and Objective Moral Constructivism: Rawls Versus Kleingeld & Willaschek.
Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, in a co-authored article, declare that their purportedly new interpretation of Immanuel Kant's writings on autonomy reveals that his moral philosophy is neither realist nor constructivist. However, as I explain here, John Rawls already occupies the area of in...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 51; no. 2; pp. 571 - 597 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164659332&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164659332 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00483893 1VPF jtl: Philosophia issn: 00483893 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Apr2023 vid: 51 iid: 2 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 164659332 10.1007/s11406-023-00620-5 ppf: 571 ppct: 26 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 638KB tig: atl: Autonomy and Objective Moral Constructivism: Rawls Versus Kleingeld & Willaschek. aug: au: Bernstein, Alyssa Rose affil: Philosophy Department, Ohio University, 1 Ohio University, 45701, Athens, OH, USA su: Autonomy (Philosophy) Realism Kleingeld, Pauline Kantian ethics Willaschek, Marcus sug: subj: Autonomy (Philosophy) Realism Kleingeld, Pauline Kantian ethics Willaschek, Marcus keyword: Autonomy Constructivism Immanuel Kant John Rawls Moral law Moral objectivity Moral obligation Normativity ab: Pauline Kleingeld and Marcus Willaschek, in a co-authored article, declare that their purportedly new interpretation of Immanuel Kant's writings on autonomy reveals that his moral philosophy is neither realist nor constructivist. However, as I explain here, John Rawls already occupies the area of intellectual territory to which Kleingeld and Willaschek attempt to lay claim: Rawls interprets Kant's moral philosophy as neither realist, as Kleingeld and Willaschek evidently construe this term, nor constructivist, as they evidently construe this term. Contra Kleingeld and Willaschek, the moral constructivism attributed to Kant by Rawls is not voluntarist, and Rawls's account of Kant's concept of autonomy is not paradoxical. In order to understand autonomy, it is necessary to understand Kant's complex conception of the will, which structures his moral philosophy (as Rawls, unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, explains). Rawls, like Kant, but unlike Kleingeld and Willaschek, clearly distinguishes between certain importantly different questions about normativity and obligation. Kant's moral philosophy, according to Rawls's insightful interpretation, is a form of objective moral constructivism. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophia is a copyright of Springer, 2023. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophia holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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