Knowing, Telling, Trusting.
This paper falls into three parts. The first looks at wh-constructions, focussing on the so-called factual whs , 'X knows where... ', 'when', 'who', 'what' etc. I suggest, drawing on both linguistic considerations and evidence from developmental psychology, that these constructions take things as th...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Quarterly Vol. 73; no. 3; pp. 762 - 783 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Oxford University Press / USA
Jul2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=164689682&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 164689682 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318094 PHQ jtl: Philosophical Quarterly issn: 00318094 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Jul2023 vid: 73 iid: 3 pid: 622 pub: Oxford University Press / USA artinfo: ui: 164689682 10.1093/pq/pqad033 ppf: 762 ppct: 21 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 207KB tig: atl: Knowing, Telling, Trusting. aug: au: Holton, Richard affil: University of Cambridge , UK su: Trust Developmental psychology Proposition (Logic) Truth Assertions (Logic) sug: subj: Trust Developmental psychology Proposition (Logic) Truth Assertions (Logic) keyword: knowledge telling testimony trust wh-constructions ab: This paper falls into three parts. The first looks at wh-constructions, focussing on the so-called factual whs , 'X knows where... ', 'when', 'who', 'what' etc. I suggest, drawing on both linguistic considerations and evidence from developmental psychology, that these constructions take things as their objects, not propositions; and that this may be why they are learned before those taking sentential complements. The second part moves to the case of telling- wh : to constructions such as telling someone who is at the door. This construction brings a very particular set of requirements, not just to tell the truth, but to tell all the relevant truths and nothing but. The third section, in a critical discussion of Katherine Hawley's work, argues that an account of trust and testimony focussing on the telling- wh construction brings better results than one focussed on the blander idea of assertion. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: © 2019 Scots Philosophical Association and the University of St. Andrews. item: Philosophical Quarterly holder: Oxford University Press / USA dt: @attributes: year: 2023 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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