A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm.

As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments,...

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Publicado en:Science & Engineering Ethics Vol. 29; no. 4; pp. 1 - 27
Autores principales: Champagne, Marc, Tonkens, Ryan
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug2023
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        atl: A Comparative Defense of Self-initiated Prospective Moral Answerability for Autonomous Robot harm.
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          Champagne, Marc
          Tonkens, Ryan
        affil:
          Department of Philosophy, Kwantlen Polytechnic University, 12666, 72 Avenue, Surrey, Canada
          Department of Philosophy and Centre for Health Care Ethics, Lakehead University, 874 Tungsten Street, Room MP1002, P7B 5E1, Thunder Bay, Canada
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      keyword:
        Answerability
        Artificial intelligence
        Ethics
        Responsibility
        Robotics
      ab: As artificial intelligence becomes more sophisticated and robots approach autonomous decision-making, debates about how to assign moral responsibility have gained importance, urgency, and sophistication. Answering Stenseke’s (2022a) call for scaffolds that can help us classify views and commitments, we think the current debate space can be represented hierarchically, as answers to key questions. We use the resulting taxonomy of five stances to differentiate—and defend—what is known as the “blank check” proposal. According to this proposal, a person activating a robot could willingly make themselves answerable for whatever events ensue, even if those events stem from the robot’s autonomous decision(s). This blank check solution was originally proposed in the context of automated warfare (Champagne & Tonkens, 2015), but we extend it to cover all robots. We argue that, because moral answerability in the blank check is accepted voluntarily and before bad outcomes are known, it proves superior to alternative ways of assigning blame. We end by highlighting how, in addition to being just, this self-initiated and prospective moral answerability for robot harm provides deterrence that the four other stances cannot match.
      pubtype: Academic Journal
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    language: English
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