Lemos on the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.
I recently argued that reductive physicalist versions of libertarian free will face a physical indeterminism luck objection. John Lemos claims that one potential advocate of reductive physicalist libertarianism, Robert Kane, avoids this physical indeterminism luck objection. I here show how the prob...
| Publicado en: | Philosophia Vol. 51; no. 3; pp. 1459 - 1478 |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Jul2023
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | I recently argued that reductive physicalist versions of libertarian free will face a physical indeterminism luck objection. John Lemos claims that one potential advocate of reductive physicalist libertarianism, Robert Kane, avoids this physical indeterminism luck objection. I here show how the problem remains. |
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