Spacetime and Conventionalism.
Salmon, following Reichenbach and others, maintained that distant simultaneity was conventional in a special relativistic world in a way in which this was not so in pre-relativistic spacetime. This paper surveys and criticizes a number of proposals to unpack this claim. It goes on to argue that if t...
| Publicado en: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 71; no. 5; pp. 950 - 960 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2004
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=16630046&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 16630046 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2004 vid: 71 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 16630046 10.1086/425949 ppf: 950 ppct: 10 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 64KB tig: atl: Spacetime and Conventionalism. aug: au: Sklar, Lawrence affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48109. su: Causation (Philosophy) Metaphysics Philosophy Causal models Surveys Theory of knowledge sug: subj: Causation (Philosophy) Metaphysics Philosophy Causal models Surveys Theory of knowledge ab: Salmon, following Reichenbach and others, maintained that distant simultaneity was conventional in a special relativistic world in a way in which this was not so in pre-relativistic spacetime. This paper surveys and criticizes a number of proposals to unpack this claim. It goes on to argue that if the claim has validity, it rests upon differing facts about epistemic accessibility of temporal relations in the different spacetimes, and not directly upon any facts about differing causal structures in these worlds. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2004 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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