Population Genetics and Population Thinking: Mathematics and the Role of the Individual.

Ernst Mayr has criticised the methodology of population genetics for being essentialist: interested only in "types" as opposed to individuals. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that "he who does not understand the uniqueness of individuals is unable to understand the working of natural selection"...

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Published in:Philosophy of Science Vol. 71; no. 5; pp. 1189 - 1201
Main Author: Morrison, Margaret
Format: Article
Published: Cambridge University Press Dec2004
Subjects:
Online Access:View this record in EBSCOhost
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        au: Morrison, Margaret
        affil: Philosophy Department, University of Toronto, Trinity College, 319 Larkin Bldg, Toronto, ON, M5S 1H8, Canada.
      su:
        Population genetics
        Essentialism (Sexuality)
        Natural selection
        Biological evolution
        Methodology
        Mathematics
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        subj:
          Population genetics
          Essentialism (Sexuality)
          Natural selection
          Biological evolution
          Methodology
          Mathematics
      ab: Ernst Mayr has criticised the methodology of population genetics for being essentialist: interested only in "types" as opposed to individuals. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that "he who does not understand the uniqueness of individuals is unable to understand the working of natural selection" (1982, 47). This is a strong claim indeed especially since many responsible for the development of population genetics (especially Fisher, Haldane, and Wright) were avid Darwinians. In order to unravel this apparent incompatibility I want to examine the possible sources and implications of essentialism in this context and show why the kind of mathematical analysis found in Fisher's work is better seen as responsible for extending the theory of natural selection to a broader context rather than inhibiting its applicability.
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    language: English
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