Population Genetics and Population Thinking: Mathematics and the Role of the Individual.
Ernst Mayr has criticised the methodology of population genetics for being essentialist: interested only in "types" as opposed to individuals. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that "he who does not understand the uniqueness of individuals is unable to understand the working of natural selection"...
| Published in: | Philosophy of Science Vol. 71; no. 5; pp. 1189 - 1201 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Cambridge University Press
Dec2004
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| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=16630126&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 16630126 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318248 PSC jtl: Philosophy of Science issn: 00318248 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2004 vid: 71 iid: 5 pid: 15979 pub: Cambridge University Press artinfo: ui: 16630126 10.1086/425241 ppf: 1189 ppct: 12 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 78KB tig: atl: Population Genetics and Population Thinking: Mathematics and the Role of the Individual. aug: au: Morrison, Margaret affil: Philosophy Department, University of Toronto, Trinity College, 319 Larkin Bldg, Toronto, ON, M5S 1H8, Canada. su: Population genetics Essentialism (Sexuality) Natural selection Biological evolution Methodology Mathematics sug: subj: Population genetics Essentialism (Sexuality) Natural selection Biological evolution Methodology Mathematics ab: Ernst Mayr has criticised the methodology of population genetics for being essentialist: interested only in "types" as opposed to individuals. In fact, he goes so far as to claim that "he who does not understand the uniqueness of individuals is unable to understand the working of natural selection" (1982, 47). This is a strong claim indeed especially since many responsible for the development of population genetics (especially Fisher, Haldane, and Wright) were avid Darwinians. In order to unravel this apparent incompatibility I want to examine the possible sources and implications of essentialism in this context and show why the kind of mathematical analysis found in Fisher's work is better seen as responsible for extending the theory of natural selection to a broader context rather than inhibiting its applicability. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Copyright of Philosophy of Science is the property of Cambridge University Press and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites without the copyright holder's express written permission. Additionally, content may not be used with any artificial intelligence tools or machine learning technologies. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. item: Philosophy of Science holder: Cambridge University Press dt: @attributes: year: 2004 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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