Why Pains Are Not Mental Objects.

This article presents pain as mental object. It explicitly defends the thesis that pain is a mental object, and it is a major goal of this paper to dispute this view, and argue that pain is more accurately described adverbially as the way that one perceive or sense something, rather than something w...

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Detalles Bibliográficos
Publicado en:Philosophical Studies Vol. 91; no. 2; pp. 127 - 149
Autor principal: Douglas, Guy
Formato: Artículo
Publicado: Springer Nature Aug1998
Materias:
Acceso en línea:Ver este registro en EBSCOhost
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        au: Douglas, Guy
        affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Western Australia, Nedlands 6009, Australia
      su:
        Pain
        Philosophy
        Sensory perception
        Cognition
        Theory of knowledge
        Psychology
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          Pain
          Philosophy
          Sensory perception
          Cognition
          Theory of knowledge
          Psychology
      ab: This article presents pain as mental object. It explicitly defends the thesis that pain is a mental object, and it is a major goal of this paper to dispute this view, and argue that pain is more accurately described adverbially as the way that one perceive or sense something, rather than something we perceive or sense. Furthermore the author believe that the mental object view of pain is the source of other problems and disputes in this area. Perhaps to clearly establish the difference between the connate and the alien accusative it would help to consider some other similar cases.
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    language: English
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