Taking Solipsism Seriously: Nonhuman Animals and Meta-cognitive Theories of Consciousness.
Comments on the thesis that nonhuman animals lack the appropriate Higher-Order-Thoughts (HOT). Putative evidence typically given for the thesis; Case for thinking nonhuman animals lack the appropriate HOT; Philosophical assumption that any being that can have thoughts about its own mental states mus...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 103; no. 3; pp. 315 - 341 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Apr2001
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| Sumario: | Comments on the thesis that nonhuman animals lack the appropriate Higher-Order-Thoughts (HOT). Putative evidence typically given for the thesis; Case for thinking nonhuman animals lack the appropriate HOT; Philosophical assumption that any being that can have thoughts about its own mental states must also be capable of having thoughts about the mental states of others; Discussion of whether nonhuman animals have HOT; Behavioral evidence for an individual that his animal has a thought about some other animal’s mind; Idea that the only sort of consciousness that confers a being with direct moral standing is the sort of consciousness picked out by Higher-Order-Representation theories. |
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