Not All Worlds Are Stages.
The stage theory is a four-dimensional account of persistence motivated by the worm theory's inability to account for our intuitions in the cases involving coinciding objects. Like the worm theory, it claims that there are objects spread out in time, but unlike the worm theory, it argues that these...
| Publicado en: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 116; no. 3; pp. 309 - 322 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Dec2003
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=16670328&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 16670328 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00318116 4L8 jtl: Philosophical Studies issn: 00318116 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Dec2003 vid: 116 iid: 3 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 16670328 10.1023/B:PHIL.0000007237.51867.14 ppf: 309 ppct: 13 formats: fmt: @attributes: type: P size: 76KB tig: atl: Not All Worlds Are Stages. aug: au: Stuchlik, Joshua M. affil: Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN 46556-4619, USA, E-mail: su: Intuition Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy) Worms Possibility Cognition Philosophy sug: subj: Intuition Perdurantism & endurantism (Philosophy) Worms Possibility Cognition Philosophy ab: The stage theory is a four-dimensional account of persistence motivated by the worm theory's inability to account for our intuitions in the cases involving coinciding objects. Like the worm theory, it claims that there are objects spread out in time, but unlike the worm theory, it argues that these spacetime worms are not familiar particulars like tables and chairs. Rather, familiar particulars are the instantaneous temporal slices of worms. In order to explain our intuitions that particulars persist for more than an instant, the stage theory draws on the counterpart theory of modal possibilism, which it is supposed to parallel. In this paper I show how the stage theory presupposes that time can be divided into instants, which I call the atomistic view of time. I do this by laying out an alternative theory of the nature of time, the gunky view, and show that if time is gunky the stage theory collapses into the worm theory. The deeper problem is that the mere possibility of gunky time would cause the stage theory's parallels to possibilism to break down. I therefore conclude that the stage theory is committed to the view that time is necessarily atomistic. Finally, in the last section I argue that the fact that the stage theory rules out a priori the possibility of time being gunky gives us reason to reject it as an account of persistence. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Philosophical Studies is a copyright of Springer, 2003. All Rights Reserved. item: Philosophical Studies holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2003 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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