Necessity and Rigidly Designating Kind Terms.
Kripke claims that certain kind terms, particularly natural kind terms, are, like names, rigid designators. However, kind terms are more complicated than names as each is connected both to a principle of inclusion and an extension. So, there is a question regarding what it is that rigidly designatin...
| Published in: | Philosophical Studies Vol. 119; no. 3; pp. 243 - 265 |
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| Format: | Article |
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Springer Nature
Jun2004
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | View this record in EBSCOhost |
| Summary: | Kripke claims that certain kind terms, particularly natural kind terms, are, like names, rigid designators. However, kind terms are more complicated than names as each is connected both to a principle of inclusion and an extension. So, there is a question regarding what it is that rigidly designating kind terms rigidly designate. In this paper, I assume that there are rigidly designating kind terms and attempt to answer the question as to what it is that they rigidly designate. I then use this analysis of rigidly designating kind terms to show how Kripke's reasoning regarding the necessity of `Hesperus is Phosphorus' can be extended to statements involving kind terms like `Water is HO' and `Tigers are mammals'. |
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