Truth predicates, truth bearers, and their variants.
Theories of truth can hardly avoid taking into account how truth is expressed in natural language. Existing theories of truth have generally focused on true occurring with that-clauses. This paper takes a closer look at predicates of truth (and related notions) when they apply to objects as the refe...
| Publicado en: | Synthese Vol. 198; pp. 689 - 717 |
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| Formato: | Artículo |
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Springer Nature
Feb2021 Supplement 2
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| Acceso en línea: | Ver este registro en EBSCOhost |
| fields | @attributes: recordID: 1 pdfLink: plink: https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=hlh&AN=167361054&site=ehost-live header: @attributes: shortDbName: hlh uiTerm: 167361054 longDbName: Humanities International Complete uiTag: AN controlInfo: bkinfo: jinfo: jid: 00397857 4LI jtl: Synthese issn: 00397857 maglogo: N pubinfo: dt: Feb2021 Supplement 2 vid: 198 pid: 237 pub: Springer Nature artinfo: ui: 167361054 10.1007/s11229-018-1814-8 ppf: 689 ppct: 28 formats: fmt: – @attributes: type: T – @attributes: type: P size: 472KB tig: atl: Truth predicates, truth bearers, and their variants. aug: au: Moltmann, Friederike affil: CNRS-IHPST, Paris, France su: Satisfaction Natural languages Noun phrases Philosophy of language Normativity (Ethics) sug: subj: Satisfaction Natural languages Noun phrases Philosophy of language Normativity (Ethics) keyword: Correctness Normativity Partial content Propositions Truth Truthmaker ab: Theories of truth can hardly avoid taking into account how truth is expressed in natural language. Existing theories of truth have generally focused on true occurring with that-clauses. This paper takes a closer look at predicates of truth (and related notions) when they apply to objects as the referents of referential noun phrases. It argues that truth predicates and their variants, predicates of correctness, satisfaction and validity, do not apply to propositions (not even with that-clauses), but to a range of attitudinal and modal objects, objects we refer to as 'claims', 'beliefs', 'judgments', 'demands', 'promises, 'obligations' etc. As such natural language reflects a notion of truth that is primarily a normative notion, which, however, is not action-guiding, but rather constitutive of representational objects, independently of any actions that may go along with them. The paper furthermore argues that the predicate true is part of a larger class of satisfaction predicates whose semantic differences are best accounted for in terms of a truthmaker theory along the lines of Fine's (A companion to the philosophy of language, Wiley, Chichester, 2017b) truthmaker semantics. Truthmaker theory also provides a notion of partial content for attitudinal and modal objects, which may exhibit partial correctness, partial satisfaction, and partial validity. pubtype: Academic Journal doctype: Article src: R language: English refInfo: copyright: @attributes: flag: Y custom: Synthese is a copyright of Springer, 2021. All Rights Reserved. item: Synthese holder: Springer Nature dt: @attributes: year: 2021 holdings: @attributes: islocal: N |
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